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ABSTRACT 
Under Kyoto, forestry activities that sequester carbon can be used to create CO2 offset 
credits that could obviate the need for lifestyle-changing reductions in fossil fuel use. Credits are 
earned by storing carbon in forest ecosystems and wood products, although CO2 emissions are 
also mitigated by delaying deforestation, which accounts for one-quarter of anthropogenic CO2 
emissions. Non-permanent carbon offsets from forest activities are difficult to compare with each 
other and with mitigation strategies because they differ in how long they prevent CO2 from 
entering the atmosphere. In this paper, we investigate issues of carbon sequestration in detail, but 
in particular we expand in comprehensive fashion on earlier work comparing carbon mitigation 
activities according to how long they can lower atmospheric CO2 levels. The duration problem is 
modeled theoretically. Meta-regression analysis with 1047 observations from 68 studies is then 
used to determine whether the duration problem leads to inconclusive results between carbon-
uptake costs and carbon sequestration. In addition, from the regression analysis, it is possible to 
estimate potential costs of carbon uptake via forestry activities for various scenarios. It turns out 
that forestry activities are competitive with emissions reduction in tropical regions and, perhaps, 
in boreal regions, but certainly not in Europe. 
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  ii1. INTRODUCTION 
Scientists and engineers are particularly enthusiastic about the possibility of sequestering 
carbon in terrestrial ecosystems or storing it in geological reservoirs, thereby creating CO2 
offsets that could obviate the need for lifestyle-changing reductions in fossil fuel use. Some 
scientists claim that, by converting marginal croplands to permanent grasslands or forests, the 
accompanying increase in biomass and soil organic carbon can offset 20% or more of countries’ 
fossil fuel emissions (Sathaye et al. 2001; Lal 2004a, 2004b). The Government of Canada (2002) 
had planned to rely on tree planting and improved forest management for meeting some one-
third of its Kyoto commitment, although subsequent losses of large swaths of timber to Mountain 
Pine Beetle and wildfire has caused some re-thinking of the contribution to be expected from 
forests. More recently, proponents of CO2 capture and storage in deep underground aquifers and 
abandoned oil/gas fields indicate that there is enough available storage to trap decades of CO2 
emissions (Parson and Keith 1998). The costs of this option are unknown as there is a risk of a 
sudden release of deadly concentrations of CO2 in the future – a cost evaluated by the 
willingness of people to pay to avoid such a risk and not unlike that associated with long-term 
storage of nuclear waste, which Riddel and Shaw (2003) indicate could be substantial. 
Given that carbon offset credits from agricultural activities are particularly ephemeral and 
that CO2 capture and storage occurs underground, forestry activities are considered the most 
promising land-based activity for creating offset credits. Credits are earned by storing carbon in 
forest ecosystems and wood products, although harvested fibre can also be burned in lieu of 
fossil fuels, thereby reducing CO2 emissions. It is also possible to mitigate CO2 emissions by 
delaying (perhaps indefinitely) deforestation that accounts for more than one-quarter of all 
anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions. With the exception of biomass burning in place of    
fossil fuels, sink activities create ephemeral offsets – terrestrial carbon storage is somehow less 
permanent than CO2 emission reductions. Most commentators believe that the carbon embodied 
in forests and, especially, agricultural ecosystems (grass and soils) is always at risk of accidental 
or deliberate release, but that avoided emissions are ‘permanent’, despite the fact that ‘saved’ 
fossil fuels might release stored CO2 at some future date (Herzog et al. 2003).  
There is no denying that forestry activities create non-permanent carbon offsets, which 
creates problems for policy makers who wish to compare mitigation strategies that differ in the 
length of time they prevent CO2 from entering the atmosphere. How should emerging markets 
for emissions trading value permanence? What is the implication of this for cost-benefit analyses 
that seek to rank alternative policy options? More specifically, how have producers of carbon 
offsets from forestry activities determined the value of these credits? And what guarantees do 
buyers have that forest-generated credits are cheaper than emission reduction offsets? 
The purpose of this paper is to investigate these issues in greater detail. We do so by 
expanding in comprehensive fashion on earlier work by Marland et al. (2001), Sedjo and 
Marland (2003), and Herzog et al. (2003). In particular, we compare carbon mitigation activities 
according to how long they are able to lower CO2 levels in the atmosphere. This is important 
because storage times differ even among forestry activities, with some being more ‘permanent’ 
than others. As a result, we also re-visit an earlier meta-regression analysis of carbon uptake 
costs by van Kooten et al. (2004). The relevant regression model in the earlier study employed 
781 observations from 43 studies, while the current meta-regression analysis uses 1047 
observations from 68 studies. 
We proceed as follows. In the next section, we consider the main economic issues 
regarding the role of terrestrial carbon sinks for mitigating climate change. Then, in section 3, we 
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investigate the implications of non-permanence of biological sinks in a formal fashion to 
determine whether the stop-gap nature of forestry activities makes it more burdensome for 
producers and buyers of temporary carbon offsets to value such credits, thereby adding to 
transaction costs (say, by thwarting some trades). This is not the same as asking whether forestry 
activities can make a reasonable and useful contribution to a country’s overall mitigation 
strategy, although it does shed light on this issue. In section 4, we discuss the meta-regression 
model and its implications for our research problem. 
2. NON-PERMANENCE OF GREENHOUSE GAS MITIGATION  
The comparison of relevance in this study is between biological sink (especially forestry) 
activities and emissions reduction as two means for reducing atmospheric CO2. We ignore 
carbon capture and storage for reasons discussed above, although much of the analysis in this 
section would apply to it as well. 
Biological Sinks 
Land use, land-use change and forestry (LULUCF) activities can lead to CO2 offset 
credits (or debits). Tree planting and activities that enhance tree growth clearly remove carbon 
from the atmosphere and store it in biomass, and thus are eligible activities for creating CO2 
offset credits. However, there is concern that tree plantations will release a substantial amount of 
their stored carbon once harvested, which could happen as soon as five years after establishment 
if fast-growing hybrid species are planted. Sequestered carbon might also be released as a result 
of wildfire, disease and/or pests (e.g., Mountain Pine Beetle infestation in British Columbia). 
In addition to forest ecosystem sinks, agricultural activities that lead to enhanced soil 
organic carbon and/or more carbon stored in biomass can be used to claim offset credits. 
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Included under Kyoto are re-vegetation (establishment of vegetation that does not meet the 
definitions of afforestation and reforestation), cropland management (greater use of conservation 
tillage, more set asides) and grazing management (manipulation of the amount and type of 
vegetation and livestock produced). Most of these activities provide temporary CO2 offsets only. 
One study reported, for example, that all of the soil organic carbon stored as a result of 20 years 
of conservation tillage was released in a single year of conventional tillage (Lewandrowski et al. 
2004). Likewise, there is concern that soil management practices could be stopped by farmers at 
any time as a consequence of changes in prices and technologies. Finally, given that costs of 
conservation tillage have declined dramatically in the past several decades, it is questionable 
whether increases in soil carbon that result from conservation tillage can be counted towards 
Kyoto targets, simply because they cannot be considered ‘additional’ as they are being 
undertaken by farmers to reduce costs and conserve soil (not to sequester carbon per se).  
Emission Reductions 
While the Kyoto Protocol permits various terrestrial options, particularly ones related to 
biological sinks, its main focus is on the avoidance of greenhouse gas emissions, especially CO2 
emissions associated with the burning of fossil fuels. What are the long-term consequences of 
reducing current fossil fuel use? Some argue that, by leaving fossil fuels in the ground, their 
eventual use is only delayed and, as with carbon sequestered in a terrestrial sink, results in the 
same obligation for the future (Herzog et al. 2003). The reasoning behind this is that the price 
path of fossil fuels will be lower in the future because, by reducing use today, more fossil fuels 
are available for future use than would otherwise be the case. However, fossil fuels left in the 
ground may not be used in the future, because, if society commits to de-carbonizing the 
economy, behaviour may change and technology evolve in ways that reduce future demand for 
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fossil fuels, much as the demand for wood used by locomotives was replaced by coal and then by 
diesel. Carbon in terrestrial sinks, on the other hand, always has the potential to be released.  
Discounting Physical Carbon 
By discounting carbon, one acknowledges that it matters when CO2 is emitted or carbon 
sequestered – CO2 removed from the atmosphere today is more important and has greater 
potential benefits than that removed at some future time. While the idea of discounting physical 
carbon is anathema to many who would discount only monetary values, the notion of weighting 
physical units accruing at different times is entrenched in the resource economics literature, 
going back to economists’ definitions of conservation and depletion (Ciriacy-Wantrup 1968). 
One cannot obtain consistent estimates of the costs of carbon uptake unless both project costs 
and physical carbon are discounted, even if different rates of discount are employed for costs and 
carbon (see van Kooten 2004, pp.76-77; Boyland 2006).  
The effect of discounting physical carbon is to increase the costs of creating CO2 offset 
credits because discounting effectively results in ‘less carbon’ attributable to a terrestrial carbon 
project. Discounting financial outlays, on the other hand, reduces the cost of creating carbon 
offsets. Since most financial outlays occur early on in the life of a forest or CO2 storage project 
while carbon uptake is spread over time, costs of creating carbon offsets are not as sensitive to 
the discount rate used for costs as to that used for carbon. Discounting physical carbon has 
important implications. For example, it implies that temporary carbon storage is more valuable. 
Addressing the Permanence Issue 
The permanence problem can be addressed by providing partial instead of full credits for 
stored carbon according to the perceived risk that carbon will be released from a sink at some 
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future date. The buyer or seller may be required to take out an insurance policy, where the 
insurer will compensate for the losses associated with unexpected carbon release (Subak 2003). 
Alternatively, the buyer or seller can provide some assurance that the temporary activity will be 
followed by one that results in permanent emission reductions. Again, insurance contracts can be 
used if there is a chance that the carbon contained in a sink is released prematurely. To address 
the risk of loss, a provider of offsets may be required, for example, to convert more land into 
forest than needed to sequester the contracted amount of carbon, or the rate used to discount 
physical carbon could be increased to account for uncertainty.  
Three ‘practical’ approaches to non-permanence of sinks have been discussed in the 
literature. First, one ton of carbon-equivalent CO2 emissions can be compensated for by a ton of 
carbon uptake with the conversion rate between ton-years of (temporary) carbon sequestration 
and permanent tons of carbon emissions reductions specified in advance (Dutschke 2002; IPCC 
2000). If k is the conversion rate, then a LULUCF project must sequester k tons of carbon for one 
year to cover the one ton reduction in emissions.
1 The exchange rate ranges from 42 to 150 ton-
years of temporary storage to cover one permanent ton. The ton-year concept has been 
condemned on various grounds (Herzog et al. 2003; Marland et al. 2001), but it has a certain 
appeal, primarily because it provides a simple, albeit naïve, accounting solution to the problem 
of permanence. The choice of an exchange rate is arbitrarily based on rotation length and is 
effectively a political decision. Once an exchange rate is chosen, carbon uptake credits can be 
traded in a CO2-emissions market in straightforward fashion. But, clearly, the ton-years approach 
disadvantages carbon sinks relative to emissions avoidance (Dutschke 2002).  
                                                 
1 This interpretation is slightly different from the original intent. The original idea is to count a 
temporary ton as equivalent to a permanent one only if the carbon is sequestered for the full 
period of time given by the exchange rate. The advantage of this interpretation is that one can 
count carbon stored in a sink for periods as short as one year, as might be the case in agriculture. 
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A second approach that has been adopted for Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) 
forestry projects is the creation of a ‘temporary’ certified emission reduction (CER) unit, denoted 
tCER. The idea is that a tCER is purchased for a set period of time and would, upon expiry, have 
to be covered by substitute credits or reissued credits if the original project were continued. 
Compared to ton-years, monitoring and verification are more onerous because a more complex 
system of bookkeeping will be required at the international level to keep track of credits. Under 
this approach, countries can obtain carbon credits early, while delaying their ‘payment’ to a 
future date. 
A third approach employs a market device that would obviate the need for an arbitrary 
conversion factor or other forms of political manoeuvring. Marland et al. (2001) and Sedjo and 
Marland (2003) propose a rental system for sequestered carbon. A one-ton emission offset credit 
is earned when the sequestered carbon is rented from a landowner for a finite term, but, upon 
expiry, the renter incurs a debit unless the rental contract is renewed. The buyer-renter employs 
the limited-term benefits of the asset, but the seller-host retains long-term discretion over the 
asset, including responsibility for the liability after the (short-term) lease expires. Rather than the 
authority establishing a conversion factor, the interaction between the market for emission 
reduction credits and that for carbon sink credits can determine the conversion rate between 
permanent and temporary removals of CO2 from the atmosphere. The rental rate for temporary 
storage is based on the price of a permanent emissions credit, which is determined by the market. 
Like the ton-year concept, a rental scheme makes terrestrial sink projects less attractive relative 
to emissions reduction. 
3. SUPPLY OF CARBON OFFSET CREDITS AND THE ‘PERMANENCE’ ISSUE 
Consider a comparison between two climate change mitigation options, neither of which 
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results in permanent removal of CO2 from the atmosphere. Suppose that the more permanent of 
the two, say a policy that leads to a lower current rate of CO2 emissions, leads to an increase in 
CO2 emissions N years from now, as argued by Herzog et al. (2003); the more ephemeral project 
generates temporary offset credits through sequestration of CO2 in a forest ecosystem, but 
releases the CO2 in n years.
2 What then is the value of forest-sink offset credit relative to an 
emissions reduction credit? Suppose that a unit of CO2 not in the atmosphere is currently worth 
$q, but that the shadow price rises at an annual rate γ<r, the discount rate. Then the value of 
emissions reduction is: 
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while a sink offset would be worth some proportion α of the emissions reduction, or: 







1 ) 1 (





























.        ( 2 )  

































,           ( 3 )  
which depends on the discount rate (r), the time it takes a ton of CO2 stored in a forest ecosystem 
to return to the atmosphere (n), and the time it takes a ton of CO2 not emitted today to increase 
emissions at a future date (N). Notice that the value does not depend on the price of carbon (q). 
                                                 
2 The comparison could just as well be between two forestry carbon sequestration projects with 
different degrees of ‘permanence’. 
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As indicated in Table 1, the proportional value of a sink credit to an emissions reduction credit 
(α) varies depending on the relationship between n and N, the discount rate (r), and the growth 
rate (γ) in damages from CO2. It is possible to prove some general results. 
Proposition 1: For fixed and finite N>0, as n/N→0, the value of temporary storage relative to 
permanent emissions reduction goes to zero.  
























































































































.                                                                  (5) 
The reason for the signs is that the natural logarithm of a number less than 1 is negative (recall 
γ<r). Clearly, as the length of temporary storage increases relative to the ‘permanence’ of a CO2 
emission reduction (because of the ceteris paribus condition), the value of a temporary sink 
relative to an emission reduction increases; thus, as n/N→0, α→0. The value of a temporary sink 
decreases as the ‘permanence’ of an emission reduction increases, ceteris paribus, because the 
period of sequestration (n) becomes too small to have any value. This might well be the case for 
carbon stored in soil due to conservation tillage.  
Proposition 2: For fixed n/N, an increase in N narrows the difference in importance between an 
emissions reduction and a carbon sequestration activity, ceteris paribus. An increase in N 
‘lengthens’ n so that, with discounting, the eventual release of stored carbon (at time n) is valued 
much less today. If N→∞ so that an emission reduction is truly permanent, then the value of 
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temporary storage depends only on the length of time that carbon is sequestered.  
Proof: The second term in the denominator of (3) approaches 0 as N→∞, so that the value of a 
temporary sink credit relative to a permanent one depends only on n (given γ and r). Since 
storage is not infinite, temporary offsets are still less valuable than permanent emission 
reductions.  
Proposition 3: The value of storage increases with the discount rate (∂α/∂r>0), as illustrated in 
Table 1. The reason that ephemeral activities are more important relative to emission reductions 
as the discount rate increases is because the inevitable release of sink CO2 at some future date is 
weighted much less than the early sequestration. Thus, a policy requiring the use of low discount 
rates for evaluating climate change activities militates against carbon uptake in terrestrial sinks. 
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, which holds for all n, N > 0, n<N, if γ<r. The 
proof is numerical. Clearly, if n=N, 
r ∂
∂α
=0. Assume r=0.04 and γ =0.02. Then, if n=1 and N=2, 
we find ½ >0.4951; if n=50 and N=100, ½ >0.2747; if n=250 and N=500, ½ >0.0077; and so on.  
Proposition 4: As the rate at which the shadow price of carbon (γ) increases, the value of 
temporary storage relative to a ‘permanent’ emission reduction decreases. This implies that 
landowners would supply less carbon when the price of carbon is rising over time. The reason is 
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that the supply of offset credits is a positive function of α and ∂α/∂γ < 0. 
Proof: Differentiate (3) with respect to γ: 
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.  Denote by S(α,P;Z) the supply of carbon offset sink credits, 
where α is the relative price of ‘temporary’ versus ‘permanent’ credits (as before), P is a vector 
of carbon input prices and the price of a permanent credit, and Z is a vector of characteristics that 
describes the offset project. Since  0






, S(α,P;Z) shifts up with an increase in the 
price of carbon offset credits relative to emission reduction credits because ∂α/∂γ<0.  
Proposition 5: The minimum value of a carbon sink credit relative to an emission reduction 
credit equals the ratio of the lifetimes of the ‘temporary’ and ‘permanent’ credits, n/N.  
Proof: Only γ<r is possible because, if γ>r, economic agents would pursue climate mitigation 
(by purchasing carbon sink credits) to such an extent that the rate of growth in atmospheric CO2 
(the price of carbon credits) falls enough to equalize γ and r. Consider r→
+γ. In that case, (1) 
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Policy Implications 
The forgoing results have important policy implications that arise from the non-
permanence associated with some policy instruments and the necessity of discounting physical 
carbon. It is clear that sink offset credits cannot generally be traded one-for-one for emission 
reduction credits, even if the latter are not considered permanent. The conversion rate will 
depend on the length of time that each keeps CO2 out of the atmosphere, and, crucially, on the 
discount rate. For example, if a sequestration project can ensure that carbon remains sequestered 
for 10 years, it is worth only 0.11 of an emission reduction that ensures no future increase in 
emissions for 200 years if the discount rate (r) is 2% and the growth rate of damages (γ) is 1% 
(Table 1). Given the difficulty of determining not only the discount rate but the uncertainty 
surrounding n and N, it is not possible for the authority to determine a conversion factor. Rather, 
one must rely on the market to determine the exchange rate. Lack of market data for use in cost-
benefit analysis requires that the analyst make some arbitrary judgments about the conversion 
rate between permanent and temporary removal of CO2 from the atmosphere. While it is possible 
that carbon prices will increase over time, the value of temporary sequestration will be even 
lower. As a consequence, there might be a reduced demand for short-term sequestration.  
While some advocate for the use of low discount rates, we demonstrated that rates can go 
no lower than the rate of increase in global environmental damage resulting from anthropogenic 
emissions of CO2 – that is, no lower than the rate of increase in the shadow price of carbon. 
When discount rates are set at their lowest value, CO2 offset credits are only worth n/N of an 
emission-reduction credit. This implies that ‘temporary’ offsets related to biological sink 
activities are overvalued because, as N→∞, the value of a temporary offset credit falls to zero. It 
is reasonable to assume that N→∞ if a carbon tax, say, results in behavioural changes that cause 
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permanent reductions in CO2 emissions (e.g., people trade in their SUV for a smaller vehicle). 
Many CDM-initiated forestry activities seek to sell CO2 offsets in international markets. 
Forestry projects in developed nations have the same objective. Although some projects are 
simply funded by international agencies, or ‘picked up’ by companies seeking to improve their 
corporate image, the forgoing analysis indicates the impossibility of determining the true cost of 
providing these types of offsets. Indeed, because most studies make ad hoc assumptions about 
the future path of prices, carbon uptake, harvests, risks of forest denudation and so on, it is 
impossible to judge adequately the true costs of carbon sequestration through forestry activities. 
Nonetheless, forestry offset credits are deemed acceptable for meeting Kyoto targets. To 
investigate how estimates of the costs of creating forestry offset credits are affected in practice 
by the issues indicated above, we employ meta-regression analysis.  
4. META-REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF COSTS OF FOREST CO2 OFFSETS 
Meta-analysis synthesizes previously documented empirical results by combining or re-
analyzing them in order to increase the power of statistical hypothesis testing (Koetse et al. 
2005). Meta-regression analysis (MRA) is a type of meta-analysis that objectively explains why 
and quantifies how estimates from a range of empirical studies differ (Roberts 2005). MRA 
provides a framework for replicating results from different studies and offers a sensitivity 
analysis for model specification (Stanley 2005). Its intent is to summarize the results of many 
individual studies, where key estimates differ in significance, magnitude and even sign. MRA 
provides a more general description of the relationship between the variables, and can identify a 
significant trend from a large number of studies, even where individual studies might fail to find 
such evidence (Mann 1990, 1994).  
In meta-regression analysis, statistical summary indicators are referred to as effect-sizes. 
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In the non-experimental set-up typical in economics, the effect-size indicator is typically an 
elasticity or nominal value (Florax 2002). The non-experimental setting introduces specific 
methodological challenges, however, because the meta-analysis is intrinsically heteroskedastic as 
the effect-sizes originate from studies with differing numbers of observations, which results in 
different estimated standard errors (Travisi et al. 2004). The true data generating process is often 
unknown, which leads to a mix of correct and erroneous effect-size measures, and the varying 
sets of control variables across the studies induce omitted variable bias and/or multicollinearity 
in at least a subset of the available primary studies (Koetse et al. 2005). Recent methodological 
advances help considerably in mitigating these challenges.  
Many meta-analyses employ averaged values of the dependent and independent variables 
within a given source, so that the number of observations equals the number of studies 
investigated, but this could lead to aggregation bias in the meta-model if nonlinear specifications 
are employed (Stoker 1984, 1993). Additionally, using average values does not make use of all 
the information available in the primary studies. On the other hand, when multiple estimates are 
included, estimates originating from the same primary study are not independent of each other 
and studies with a larger number of estimates receive more weight if each of the estimates is 
treated as a separate observation.  
A fixed- or random-effects specification can be used to address the issue related to 
multiple estimates. There has been considerable debate about whether it is appropriate to assume 
that heterogeneity can be fully explained by employing a fixed-effects model (Sutton et al. 2000, 
pp.83-84).
3 In environmental economics, most MRAs use fixed-effects models that permit some 
                                                 
3 The meaning of terms fixed and random is somewhat different in the MRA literature than in the 
standard econometrics literature on panel data. In the meta-analysis literature, fixed and random 
effects relate to the weights in the meta-analysis (Weichselbaumer and Winter-Ebmer 2005).  
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heterogeneity in the meta-analysis, although it might be more desirable to assume that the 
underlying population effect-sizes differ between studies and that those effect-sizes are seen as 
random draws from a normal distribution (Florax 2002). The random-effects model is an 
attractive specification because, due to the randomly drawn effect-sizes, the results are easier to 
generalize and substantially higher degrees of freedom are left (Travisi et al. 2004).  
As a response to the debate, we estimate regression models that (1) use only the averages 
of the various studies, (2) weight the average study values by the number of observations, and (3) 
use all of the observations from each study within a fixed- or random-effects framework. We 
subsequently expand the analysis by examining the robustness of MRA by dropping observations 
attributable to one author. Finally, we provide estimates of the marginal costs of carbon uptake in 
various forest ecosystems. 
Regression Equation 
As discussed earlier, the costs of sequestering carbon and providing CO2 offsets from 
forestry activities have significant policy implications. In order to integrate and analyze 
previously estimated costs, we perform the following meta-regression analysis for the set of cost 
estimates generated by a given source study: 
, ... , 2 , 1
1
, S s u Z y s js
K
k
js k k is = + + + = ∑
=
ε β α        ( 8 )  
where yis is the reported estimate of sequestration costs stemming from study s, S is the total 
number of primary studies, js is the number of estimates originating from study s, α is the 
intercept term, Zk,js is the meta-independent variable, and βk is the meta-regression coefficient. 
Multiple estimates originating from the same study lead to a nested error structure that is 
decomposed into errors at the measurement level εjs and the study level us, which are assumed to 
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u, respectively (Bijmolt and 
Pieters 2001). 
The studies we review have estimated the marginal or average costs of carbon uptake. 
Lacking information on the potential form of the marginal and average cost curves, we assume, 
for simplicity, that the full regression model would take the following form: 
i K K i i i i x x C C D y ε α α α γ γ γ + + + + + + + = ... 1 1 0
2
2 1 0 , (i = 1, …, N)      (9) 
where yi refers to the total cost of carbon-uptake project i, D is a dummy variable that takes on a 
value of 1 if the study reports marginal cost and zero otherwise, C refers to carbon normalized to 
a per hectare basis, and there are K non-carbon regressors. 
Data 
Since the quality of a MRA depends on the quality of the data collection and the metrics 
chosen, we consider data issues at length. Selection bias occurs if the literature retrieval is such 
that the likelihood of sampling a study is correlated with the effect-size measure (Florax 2002). 
Thus, there should be an emphasis on including all studies, published or not, as a way of 
reducing potential biases introduced by any non-random selection of studies (Stanley 2001).
4 We 
collected information from 68 studies from various sources that provide estimates on costs of 
carbon uptake and storage in forest ecosystems. These yielded 1047 observations that were from 
over 30 countries, although most studies used data for the U.S. (21), Canada (7), Brazil (5) and 
India (3). Four studies employed data from Europe and 31 from developing countries (primarily 
in conjunction with Kyoto’s Clean Development Mechanism). The quality of the data available 
from studies varies tremendously, even among the 44 peer-reviewed articles in our sample. A 
                                                 
4 Publication bias occurs when researchers, referees or editors prefer statistically significant 
results, with insignificant findings left in the researcher’s ‘file drawer’ (Rose and Stanley 2005). 
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summary of the studies is provided in Table 2. Each of the studies provides the required 
information needed for MRA, or sufficient data to have enabled us to construct the needed 
information. However, a significant number of studies that we considered were eliminated from 
further analysis and not included in Table 2, because they provided too little detail; yet, many of 
these constituted serious efforts to sell CO2 offset credits.  
The following illustrates an example of this. In a major review of terrestrial sequestration, 
the FAO (2004) examined 49 projects that were underway or proposed to create offset credits. 
One project was in the United States, with three in Australia and two in Europe, and the 
remainder in developing countries and thus eligible for CDM credits. There were 38 forestry 
projects, of which 17 involved forest conservation (and currently not Kyoto eligible, although 
rules are being revised) that, nonetheless, had local or offshore sponsors and/or investors (a 
country and/or company). Only 33 of the 49 projects provided some information on the amount 
of carbon to be sequestered, with two of these providing no information on the extent of the area 
involved. Data on the amount of carbon sequestered was considered ‘good’ for only 24 projects, 
although none provided an indication of the timing of carbon benefits. Information on costs was 
provided for only 11 projects, with only eight providing information on carbon uptake as well. In 
essence, it is next to impossible to determine the cost-effectiveness of the projects reviewed by 
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the FAO (2004), although in some cases one could make some crude calculations.
5  
Even for studies providing the requisite data (and thus are included in our analysis), 
details in some cases are sparse, making it difficult to assess how the calculations were made. 
This was true of both peer-reviewed and non-reviewed studies. For example, Lasco et al. (2002) 
examine forest conservation as a means to offset CO2 emissions from power generation in the 
Philippines, concluding that this can be done for as little as $0.12/tC (although costs were much 
higher in other scenarios that they considered). It is not clear how they came up with such a low 
cost, but it appears they may have attributed all carbon left standing in a particular year to the 
low annual management cost of avoiding harvests, ignoring both benefits from sale of timber and 
agriculture. Nonetheless, for these and similar studies, we retained observations with information 
as provided because we had no grounds for rejecting them – we could neither refute nor 
duplicate the cost estimates provided.  
In our analysis, the dependent variable consists of cost scaled to a per ton basis, and is 
measured in 2005 $US, with values for other years deflated using the U.S. consumer price index. 
In addition to the costs of carbon uptake and the amount sequestered per hectare, data were 
collected on publication date, type of forestry project, region, discount rate on financial (cost) 
measures, discount rate on physical carbon, whether opportunity cost of land was included, post-
                                                 
5 Consider also the first CDM forestry project accepted for approval in November 2006 
(UNFCCC 2006). The 30-year project to establish 2,000 ha of multiple-use forests on degraded 
lands in Huanjiang County of Guangxi province of China involves Italy and Spain. The project’s 
internal rate of return is 8.5% (below the 12% cut-off required by China), but 15.0% if CO2 
offsets are sold for $4/tCO2. By extrapolation, the cost of creating offset credits is low, about 
$2.15/tCO2. But, despite details in UNFCCC (2006), we could not determine the true cost of 
carbon uptake. A total of 773,842 tCO2 is expected to be sequestered over the 30-year life of the 
project, which is converted to annual removals of 25,795 tCO2 (while potential loss of CO2 in 
2036 is ignored). We lack sufficient information about the timing of outlays and revenues and 
the manner in which temporary offset credits are exchanged for permanent ones. Yet, Spain and 
Italy will each claim a share of the total credits that are to be created. 
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harvest use of fibre, whether soil carbon was included, scope of study, and method used to 
calculate carbon sequestration costs. With four exceptions, each of the studies in our sample 
provided multiple estimates of one or more projects and/or regions. For the ‘study-level’ 
regressions, we employed averaged values across a study for the level variables and permitted 
multiple dummy values where a study covered more than one location, employed different 
methods, and so on. Summary statistics are provided in Tables 2 and 3. 
We consider four types of forestry projects: plantation programs (expanding forest 
ecosystems by increasing the area of plantation forests), forest conservation (avoiding 
deforestation, protecting forests in reserves, changing harvesting regimes), forest management 
that contributes to the growth of forests (e.g., silvicultural strategies such as fertilization), and 
agroforestry programs where farmers intersperse trees on agricultural land and crop underneath.  
Studies are catalogued into North America, Europe, tropics and other countries (e.g., 
Australia, Russia). We also distinguish whether studies are located in the boreal, Great Plains or 
U.S. cornbelt zones. We consider geographic scope using dummy variables to discern whether 
studies estimate costs of carbon uptake at the regional, national or global levels. 
We use dummy variables to identify three carbon pools: carbon in tree biomass 
(including above and below ground), soils and wood products – in furniture, paper and wood 
materials that replace energy intensive materials like aluminium and steel in construction 
(Marland and Schlamadinger 1997). In addition, forest biomass can be used post-harvest to 
produce energy. We also classify three methods for calculating carbon uptake costs: sectoral 
optimization, econometrics and other (bottom-up) methods, with the latter taken as the base case.  
Our MRA models also include dummy variables for opportunity cost of land (=1 if 
opportunity cost is included), marginal cost (=1 if marginal cost is included) and whether the 
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study was peer reviewed (=1 if peer reviewed), and a general intercept term. 
5. ESTIMATION RESULTS  
Study Averages  
The study-level regression results are provided in Table 4, while results using individual 
observations are provided in Table 5. A variety of models were examined, with the results quite 
robust with respect to model specification. Consider first the study-level results in Table 4. When 
results are weighted by the number of observations in each study, the R
2 goodness-of-fit measure 
is higher as is the statistical significance of estimated coefficients. 
The level of carbon sequestered per hectare appears to have no significant effect in 
explaining costs, and this result holds over all the models that we examined. This finding 
supports our earlier discussion, indicating that there is a great deal of inconsistency across 
studies in how carbon uptake and costs are measured. Contrary to the earlier finding by van 
Kooten et al. (2004), the evidence indicates that estimates of carbon uptake costs that are more 
recent are lower, but only slightly.  
The discount rate on financial costs also turns out to have no statistically significant 
influence on carbon-uptake costs, although this is not surprising given that most forestry projects 
had costs skewed towards the present. What is surprising is that studies that discounted carbon 
had lower calculated costs. However, this result is statistically insignificant in all of the models.  
Regression results for other variables are easier to interpret, as shown in Table 4. One 
statistically powerful result is that projects in Europe are the most expensive to implement, with 
costs some $300 per ton of carbon ($82 per tCO2) higher than they are elsewhere, ceteris 
paribus. This could be the result of higher land prices in Europe that are not completely captured 
by the opportunity cost term (see below) and/or slower rates of tree growth. Overall, the results 
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indicate that projects in the tropics can generate CO2 offset credits at lower cost than projects in 
other regions (by some $35-$80/tCO2). There is no statistical evidence that forestry activities in 
other regions can generate more or less costly CO2 offsets.  
Tree planting leads to significantly lower costs of creating CO2 offsets than other 
activities. Indeed, the regression results indicate that tree planting costs are some $210-$460/tC 
($58-$125/tCO2) lower than for agroforestry projects (the baseline), ceteris paribus, while forest 
management projects lower costs by some $150/tC ($41/tCO2). On the other hand, conservation 
activities (preventing deforestation) might actually be more expensive than agroforestry projects, 
by some $120/tC ($33/tCO2).  
The meta-regression analysis provides no statistical support for including soil carbon 
sinks in the calculation of costs of carbon sequestration. While soil carbon may be a relatively 
large component of total terrestrial carbon, it is only a small part of the change in ecosystem 
carbon resulting from a change in land use. Thus, its importance may be overrated so that, from a 
policy standpoint, the transaction costs associated with its inclusion might well exceed the 
benefits of taking it into account. Post-harvest use of fibre is important, however, in determining 
the cost of providing CO2 offsets via forestry activities. Substituting wood biomass for fossil 
fuels in the generation of electricity, say, will reduce the costs of creating CO2 offsets by some 
$260/tC ($70/tCO2), but inclusion of product sinks actually increases costs of carbon uptake (by 
approximately $53-$58/tCO2), contrary to expectation. The latter result may simply reflect the 
fact that timber suitable for wood products grow slower.  
The effect of taking opportunity cost of land into account is also important. Taking 
opportunity cost into account adds some $30/tCO2 to costs. In some regions, the opportunity cost 
of land is indeed small because forestry is the best use of the land. However, in others, such as 
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Europe, it is very large. The empirical result regarding the opportunity cost variable is partly 
taken into account by the regional dummy variables, with regression results not reported here 
indicating a larger and more significant impact of opportunity cost when regional variables are 
removed.  
Finally, we find that projects that are regional in scope tend to find higher costs of 
sequestering carbon in forest ecosystems compared to national level estimates, ceteris paribus. 
Regional level analyses result in costs that are some $11-$21/tCO2 higher than national level 
analyses. The more relevant result is that, to the extent that global studies take into account price 
effects, the negative coefficient on the global dummy variable in the non-weighted model 
suggests that top-down models give lower carbon uptake costs than bottom-up approaches by 
some $4-$13/tCO2. However, this coefficient estimate is highly statistically insignificant. We 
also find some slight statistical evidence to indicate that studies that used an econometric 
approach find lower cost estimates than optimization models and ‘engineering-type’ bottom-up 
calculations. 
 All Observations 
In Table 5, we present the results of the fixed- and random-effects models using all of the 
1047 observations provided by the 68 studies. The Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier 
tests for random effects indicate that the assumptions underlying the random-effects model are 
not met. Hausman tests for random- and fixed-effects also imply that the random-effects 
estimators are not consistent, while F-tests for the fixed-effects models indicate that there are 
significant study-level effects. The p-values for the fixed-effects models further suggest that a 
significant amount of variation in the costs of carbon sequestration is associated with study 
differences. 
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 As is the case in the model using study averages, coefficients for both carbon 
sequestered per hectare and the carbon sequestered per hectare squared are very close to zero, but 
they are completely insignificant. The marginal cost dummy has a greater statistical impact in 
raising costs of carbon sequestration. 
The results with respect to project location concur with the earlier study-average results 
in that sequestration projects in Europe add costs to carbon uptake while projects in the tropics 
result in lower costs. 
The project activities seem to have a varied impact on the costs of carbon uptake. Tree 
planting continues to give lower costs in carbon sequestration than does agroforestry. Contrary to 
our results from the study-averages analysis, forest conservation now appears to lead to 
reductions in cost. There is little statistical significance in the coefficient on forest conservation, 
while forest management is estimated to add to carbon uptake costs, again contrary to the 
findings in Table 4. This latter result supports previous studies that indicated management 
activities are unlikely to be a cost effective way to sequester carbon (Caspersen et al. 2000).  
The carbon discount rate again has little statistical effect on the cost of carbon uptake. We 
now find that the direction in which a small change in the discount rate for costs impacts the cost 
of carbon is positive, as anticipated. 
Whereas the fossil fuel substitution dummy had an impact in the weighted model, this 
variable has little effect on cost in both the fixed- and random-effect models. Previously, our 
finding that the inclusion of product carbon sinks increases costs was not significant in the non-
weighted OLS regression model. Now taking into account product carbon sinks has statistical 
significance in the fixed-effects model. We find it is even more important to consider the 
opportunity cost of land in our specification as the coefficient estimate of the relevant dummy is 
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statistically significant in both the fixed- and random-effects models. 
Contrary to our earlier results, we find here that studies employing an econometric 
method tend to report higher estimated costs than studies using other approaches, but the finding 
is not statistically significant. 
Testing for Robustness 
In refining our analysis and checking the robustness of the MRA, we removed five 
studies by one specific author (van Kooten; see Table 2), who focused on both Europe and North 
America. In Table 6, we provide the study-level regression results from the weighted model with 
63 observations and those based on the fixed-effects model with 846 individual observations.  
For the weighted model, the R
2 measure is improved when only 63 observations are 
included (compare Tables 4 and 6). We continue to find that sequestration projects located in 
Europe are more expensive than projects elsewhere, but the estimated addition in costs is now 
lower than in the original analysis. This is likely due to the inclusion of a Dutch study in Table 4 
that was excluded in Table 6. We find comparable results that tree planting and forest 
management lower costs of creating CO2 offset credits while forest conservation raises costs 
compared to the agroforestry baseline project, ceteris paribus. 
Although we removed some one-fifth of the original 1047 observations in Table 6, the 
results remain quite robust with respect to model specification. While the coefficient for carbon 
sequestered per hectare is now statistically significant in the fixed-effects model, the estimate 
remains close to zero. Our earlier finding that more recent studies lead to lower cost is now also 
statistically significant in the fixed-effects model. Project location continues to be important as 
projects in Europe lead to higher costs, by some $510-$520/tC ($139-$143/tCO2). Our findings 
for the effect of project activities on cost concur with previous results. Contrary to the MRA in 
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Table 4, we now find an anticipated negative sign on the discount rate on costs (although the 
estimated coefficient is statistically insignificant). We also find a more pronounced increase in 
costs than previously suggested from fossil fuel substitution as well as from the inclusion of the 
opportunity cost of land. Finally, our results from using 846 observations indicate studies 
employing econometric methods tend to give lower cost estimates than studies using other 
methods. Despite some differences between the results in Tables 4 and 6, the overall conclusions 
remain fairly robust. 
Estimating Costs of Creating Carbon Offset Credits 
The regression analyses are used to provide some indication of the potential costs of 
carbon uptake from forestry activities. Our calculations are provided in Table 7. Although cost 
estimates vary widely from one model to the next, and by region and activity, some general 
conclusions can be drawn. Assuming a threshold of about $30/tCO2 (the emissions reduction 
backstop), tree planting activities in particular are generally competitive with emissions 
reductions, particularly in tropical and boreal regions. In the latter, tree planting is much more 
competitive if it is combined with the substitution of biomass as fuel in lieu of fossil fuels. Given 
that conversion of wood biomass into liquid fuel is not yet economically feasible, this implies 
greater reliance on thermal power plants that burn biomass, usually co-fired with coal. Also note 
that forest management and forest conservation are, in general, not a competitive means of 
creating CO2 offset credits, which is likely why the Kyoto process has resisted inclusion of 
efforts to reduce deforestation. And no forest activities in Europe are worth undertaking, at least 
not solely on the basis of their carbon uptake – such projects are simply too costly. This likely 
explains why Europe initially resisted efforts to include forest and other sinks in Kyoto 
accounting.  
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6. CONCLUDING REMARKS  
The main argument of this paper is that forest activities to generate CO2 offset credits 
should not be permitted in international agreements to mitigate climate change. We demonstrated 
that there are too many issues relating to, among others, the duration problem to enable analysts 
to provide clean estimates of the cost of carbon uptake in forest sinks. A review of studies 
indicates that many serious efforts to create forest CO2 offsets failed to meet standards of 
accountability: Studies provided too little information to enable an outside analyst to determine 
how much carbon was to be sequestered and at what cost, mainly because authors failed to 
address the duration problem.
6 For studies that provided the needed data, we conducted a meta-
regression analysis to determine factors that affected costs of carbon uptake and whether and 
under what conditions CO2 offsets from forestry activities could compete with emissions 
reductions. As a result, we expected a priori that, even where adequate data are available, a 
general failure to address the duration problem would preclude discovery of a strong relationship 
between costs and amount of carbon sequestered, and between costs and discount rates for 
physical carbon and financial outlays. Consequently, one expects and finds a huge disparity in 
methods used to calculate carbon-uptake costs, and the meta-regression analysis confirms this.  
Nonetheless, the MRA does provide some useful insights. For example, it is clear that 
location (Europe, tropics) and type of activity (in particular, tree planting, substitution of fossil 
fuels with biomass) have a very large influence on the estimated costs of carbon uptake, while 
other variables that we thought would affect cost estimates (such as whether soil and product 
sinks were included, whether or not a bottom-up approach was used) had no strong influence. 
These results are important in and of themselves. For example, they go a long way to explaining 
                                                 
6 Studies also failed to take into account leakages, ignored issues of ‘additonality’ and 
overlooked other issues as well. 
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why the EU opposed terrestrial sinks from the outset and why there is currently greater effort to 
get forest sinks in tropical countries accepted under CDM.  
 Of course, since we employed data from only 68 studies, it might be worthwhile to add 
to the number of studies that are currently available, as well as assess studies that provide much 
less than the requisite information used in the meta-analysis. That is, what does one do with 
incomplete information, especially given that such information is used as the basis for 
determining whether firms or governments invest millions of dollars in forestry activities that 
seek to meet Kyoto obligations? 
One cannot escape the fact that our review raises concerns about the use of forest 
activities and forest carbon sinks as a mechanism for addressing climate change. While not 
denying that plants and trees remove CO2 from the atmosphere, thereby mitigating global 
warming, we question the effectiveness of sinks within the Kyoto framework. A country that use 
carbon sequestration credits to achieve some proportion of its CO2 emissions-reduction target 
during Kyoto’s first commitment period has avoided emissions reductions. If it is to remain 
committed to long-term climate mitigation, the country must increase its emission-reduction 
target in the next commitment period. It must meet that target plus the shortfall from the previous 
period – it still needs to reduce the emissions that were covered by forestry activities. Further, the 
country is technically liable for ensuring that the stored carbon remains there, which will be 
difficult given the non-permanence of forest sinks. The temporal shifting in the emissions-
reduction burden caused by reliance on carbon sinks therefore results in an onerous obligation 
for future generations, one which they may not be willing to accept. 
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Table 1: Value of a Temporary Relative to a Permanent Carbon Credit (α), Various 
Scenarios 
2% 5% 10% 2% 5% 10% 2% 5% 10%
0.01 0.023 0.048 0.091 0.040 0.093 0.174 0.094 0.216 0.379
0.05 0.109 0.218 0.379 0.183 0.386 0.614 0.390 0.705 0.908
0.10 0.208 0.389 0.615 0.333 0.623 0.851 0.629 0.913 0.991
0.15 0.298 0.523 0.761 0.457 0.769 0.943 0.774 0.974 0.999
0.20 0.379 0.628 0.851 0.558 0.858 0.978 0.862 0.992 1.000
0.25 0.453 0.710 0.908 0.641 0.913 0.991 0.916 0.998 1.000
0.30 0.520 0.775 0.943 0.709 0.947 0.997 0.949 0.999 1.000
0.01 0.016 0.039 0.082 0.023 0.075 0.157 0.048 0.177 0.347
0.05 0.077 0.180 0.347 0.109 0.322 0.574 0.220 0.621 0.882
0.10 0.150 0.329 0.574 0.208 0.540 0.819 0.392 0.857 0.986
0.15 0.219 0.451 0.722 0.297 0.688 0.923 0.526 0.946 0.998
0.20 0.285 0.551 0.819 0.378 0.789 0.967 0.631 0.979 1.000
0.25 0.348 0.634 0.882 0.452 0.857 0.986 0.713 0.992 1.000
0.30 0.408 0.703 0.923 0.519 0.903 0.994 0.778 0.997 1.000
0.01 n.a. 0.030 0.073 n.a. 0.056 0.140 n.a. 0.135 0.314
0.05 n.a. 0.143 0.315 n.a. 0.252 0.530 n.a. 0.516 0.849
0.10 n.a. 0.266 0.530 n.a. 0.441 0.779 n.a. 0.765 0.977
0.15 n.a. 0.373 0.678 n.a. 0.583 0.896 n.a. 0.886 0.997
0.20 n.a. 0.466 0.780 n.a. 0.688 0.951 n.a. 0.945 0.999
0.25 n.a. 0.546 0.849 n.a. 0.768 0.977 n.a. 0.973 1.000
0.30 n.a. 0.615 0.897 n.a. 0.827 0.989 n.a. 0.987 1.000
0.01 n.a. 0.015 0.055 n.a. 0.022 0.106 n.a. 0.047 0.245
0.05 n.a. 0.076 0.245 n.a. 0.107 0.429 n.a. 0.215 0.754
0.10 n.a. 0.148 0.431 n.a. 0.204 0.674 n.a. 0.383 0.939
0.15 n.a. 0.217 0.571 n.a. 0.293 0.814 n.a. 0.516 0.985
0.20 n.a. 0.283 0.677 n.a. 0.373 0.894 n.a. 0.621 0.996
0.25 n.a. 0.345 0.757 n.a. 0.446 0.939 n.a. 0.704 0.999
0.30 n.a. 0.405 0.817 n.a. 0.512 0.965 n.a. 0.768 1.000
Growth rate of shadow price of carbon, γ=0.01
Growth rate of shadow price of carbon, γ=0.02
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Adams et al. (1993)  12 350.00000 58.999056  442.28 73.20
Adams et al. (1999)  39 2023.07692 145.596613  401.52 29.16
Andrasko, Heaton & Winnett (1991)  9 806.00000 6.716000  1101.94 8.88
Baral & Guha (2004)  4 316.75000 1.000000  18602.34 63.30
Benitez & Obersteiner (2003)  6 2503.33333 237.000000  698.81 66.16
Benitez et al. (2006)  3 8183.66667 2975.000000  354.11 128.73
Boscolo & Buongiorno (1997)  3 0.00123 0.000050  2911.45 118.03
Boscolo, Buongiorno & Panayotou (1997)  29 0.00140 0.000050  1371.29 49.13
Brown, Cabarle & Livernash (1997)  6 8.90000 0.560801  10.29 1.84
Cacho, Hean & Wise (2003)  17 0.00010 0.000001  773.64 7.79
Callaway & McCarl (1996)  16 119.31818 29.624646  143.39 34.09
Darmstadter & Plantinga (1991)  3 155.97333 0.523667  1056.39 3.30
Dixon et al. (1993)  5 5.98500 0.029840  180.72 4.73
Dixon et al. (1994)  14 0.81357 0.010000  27.91 27.91
Dudek & Leblanc (1990)  1 1721.91805 4.896803  1562.43 4.44
Dutschke (2000)  4 1.08088 0.135750  363.02 32.43
FAO (2004)  8 1.37713 0.094178  171.12 64.03
Fearnside (1995)  3 0.00002 0.000001  2004.77 89.78
Healey et al. (2000)  21 0.01578 0.000406  2772.95 71.34
Hoen & Solberg (1994)  16 0.77847 0.575000  2407.49 1778.25
Houghton, Unruh & Lefebvre (1991)  18 1277.77780 27.722223  447.48 12.95
Huang & Kronrad (2001)  37 0.05625 0.001000  838.78 44.63
Krcmar & van Kooten (2003)  2 3.02600 1.236390  370.14 151.23
Lasco et al. (2002)  3 2.59761 0.020438  610.38 4.81
Lashof & Tirpak (1989)  6 834.58333 138.650000  83.00 13.76
Makundi & Okiting'ati (1995)  1 30.27400 0.186380 324.90 2.00
Masera et al. (1995)  7 150.66771 1.295429 3038.74 48.63
McCarl & Callaway (1995)  43 243.88372 47.390233  383.74 72.36
McCarney, Armstrong & Adamowicz (2006)  10 50.00000 0.888713  142.71 11.04
Moulton & Richards (1990)  70 472.68069 1.988651  5227.11 26.77
Moura Costa et al. (1999)  9 11.60644 0.210933  202.93 3.35
New York State (1991)  4 0.50250 0.804341  17.33 29.51
Newell & Stavins (1999)  46 7.66417 2.074701  699.79 181.13
Nordhaus (1991)  6 3550.00000 85.000000  4144.36 115.75
Olschewski & Benitez (2005)  6 18.05400 0.102000  2576.21 14.55
Parks & Hardie (1995)  4 29.96400 6.576285  967.26 260.29
Plantinga & Mauldin (2001)  45 41.54904 0.275678  5457.40 36.28
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Plantinga, Mauldin & Miller (1999)  21 12.79848 0.188260  4596.33 67.61
Poffenberger et al. (2001)  3 0.45980 0.011000  983.05 23.52
Poffenberger et al. (2002)  6 13.58974 0.048155  11.34 0.46
Putz & Pinard (1993)  1 0.00005 0.000001  182.78 3.97
Ravindranath & Somashekhar (1995)  4 603.00000 6.750000  171.96 1.90
Richards (1997b)  22 4079.54545 266.000000  2136.11 150.70
Richards, Moulton & Birdsey (1993)  4 42903.00000 86.402266  3446.72 6.94
Schroeder, Dixon & Winjum (1993)  7 16428.64857 192.857857  330.38 23.94
Sedjo & Solomon  6 72860.00000 465.000000  5975.33 38.14
Sohngen & Brown (2006)  30 2.28500 0.219699  1921.95 130.00
Sohngen & Haynes (1997)  2 29.00000 198.000000  7.34 50.10
Sohngen & Mendelsonh (2003)  6 32233.33333 381.316667  4585.09 70.74
Solberg & Hoen (1996)  16 2.73873 0.173000  2190.05 185.76
Spinney, Prisley & Sampson (2004)  6 0.09476 0.009200  192.09 20.36
Stavins (1999)  4 238.20327 70.044409  418.05 127.62
Stavins & Richards (2005)  2 3157.62208 35.425101  2740.67 27.31
Stennes (2000)  8 1.12500 1.236400  29.96 32.93
Stennes & McBeath (2005)  2 0.25740 0.580000  134.59 303.28
Stuart & Moura Costa (1998)  2 1.12975 0.096471  24.80 2.10
Swisher (1991)  18 6.47606 0.093950  293.10 7.96
TERI (1997)  54 1.35056 0.033151  525.75 18.13
Totten (1999)  8 6.03226 0.127463  52.13 4.63
van Kooten & Bulte (2000)  26 8.92154 0.150000  22809.55 494.55
van Kooten & Hauer (2001)  29 1.13793 1.236400  79.31 86.17
van Kooten et al. (1999, 2000)  120 19.58841 4.290617  57.17 38.39
van Kooten, Arthur & Wilson (1992)  24 120.93605 4.718333  537.03 63.78
van Vliet et al. (2003)  3 1.17942 0.039155  68.19 2.45
Volz et al. (1991)  7 31.47143 3.892857  772.00 248.10
Winjum, Dixon & Schroeder (1993)  14 100.03500 1.947143  536.98 15.83
Xu (1995)  20 490.51000 10.015000  209.68 5.14
Zelek & Shively (2003)  36 2.00151 0.000001  2398.82 24.65
Mean 15.4 2886.47572 80.971894  1783.95 87.69
Maximum 120 72860.00 2975.00  22809.55 1778.25
Minimum 1 0.00002 0.000001  7.34 0.46
Standard deviation  19.42 10937.63216 367.295889  3658.28 224.51
a Carbon sequestered, land area and costs are averaged over the observations in the study. Costs are in 2005 
U.S. dollars 
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Table 3: Explanatory Variables, Means and Ranges, 1047 Observations 
Variable Mean Std.  Dev. Minimum  Maximum
Dependent Variable   
Cost of carbon uptake (2005 US $ per tC)  92.035 531.259  0  14293.68
Explanatory Variables   
Years since 1989  8.592 4.315  0  17
Carbon per hectare (tC/ha)  61.412 119.989  0.146  2384.97
Discount rate on carbon (%)  3.75 3.72  0  15.00
Discount rates on costs (%)  5.47 3.88  0  17.25
Forest activity dummy variables   
Planting of forest (=1, 0 otherwise)  0.735 0.441  0  1
Agroforestry project (=1, 0 otherwise)  0.081 0.273  0  1
Forest conservation project (=1, 0 otherwise)  0.080 0.272  0  1
Forest management project (=1, 0 otherwise)  0.260 0.439  0  1
Location of study dummy variables   
Europe (=1, 0 otherwise)  0.075 0.264  0  1
Tropics (=1, 0 otherwise)  0.302 0.459  0  1
Boreal (=1, 0 otherwise)  0.212 0.409  0  1
U.S. Cornbelt (=1, 0 otherwise)  0.132 0.338  0  1
North American Great Plains (=1, 0 otherwise)  0.119 0.324  0  1
Other location (=1, 0 otherwise)  0.457 0.498  0  1
Geographic scope dummy variables          
Global (=1, 0 otherwise)  0.034 0.182  0  1
National (=1, 0 otherwise)  0.657 0.475  0  1
Regional (=1, 0 otherwise)  0.309 0.462  0  1
Methods dummy variables   
Optimization (=1, 0 otherwise)  0.185 0.389  0  1
Econometrics (=1, 0 otherwise)  0.111 0.314  0  1
Other bottom-up/engineering (=1, 0 otherwise)  0.704 0.457  0  1
Carbon pools dummy variables   
Carbon in products (=1, 0 otherwise)  0.479 0.500  0  1
Soil carbon (=1, 0 otherwise)  0.732 0.443  0  1
Wood used for fuel (=1, 0 otherwise)  0.082 0.275  0  1
Other items dummy variables          
Opportunity cost of land (=1, 0 otherwise)  0.742 0.438  0  1
Marginal cost (=1, 0 otherwise)  0.417 0.493  0  1
Peer reviewed (=1, 0 otherwise)  0.719 0.450  0  1
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Table 4: Meta-Regression Analysis Results, Ordinary Least Squares Non-weighted and 
Weighted by Number of Observations in each Study (n=68) 
Model →  Non-weighted  Weighted by number of observations 














Intercept 397.520  0.089  310.072 0.071 652.371 0.023  589.198 0.020
Carbon per ha  -0.286 0.447  – – 0.464 0.353  – –
Carbon per ha sq’d  0.0002 0.110  – – 0.00009 0.576  – –
Marginal cost  65.080 0.362  71.333 0.217 56.433 0.266  72.582 0.087
Date of study  -14.386 0.188 -12.161 0.195 -24.048 0.057 -18.496 0.060
European location  301.813 0.051 310.914 0.044 436.635 0.004 457.686 0.003
Tropics  -187.067 0.120  -127.378 0.069 -294.726 0.044  -198.732 0.023
Boreal ecosystem  31.572 0.692  9.254 0.890 14.066 0.847  -6.530 0.922
Tree planting activity  -231.567 0.167  -212.001 0.154 -457.603 0.035  -429.987 0.040
Forest conservation   66.702 0.303  28.874 0.577 121.828 0.086  78.717 0.190
Forest management   -72.171 0.178 -71.478 0.172 -134.166 0.060  -168.010 0.045
Carbon discount rate  -11.240 0.463  -4.604 0.367 -9.127 0.526  -7.862 0.149
Carbon discount rate 
× carbon per ha  -0.051  0.505  – – -0.138 0.069  – –
Discount rate on costs  -0.243  0.973  – – 0.557 0.942  – –
Fossil fuel 
substitution -74.992  0.539 -42.703 0.618 -256.447 0.098  -242.324 0.100
Product carbon sink   98.200 0.209 119.250 0.105 195.017 0.043 213.791 0.034
Opportunity cost of 
land 99.437  0.146  76.861 0.206 108.314 0.109  79.242 0.159
Regional scope  40.820 0.410  45.898 0.294 75.415 0.268  66.805 0.216
Global scope   -15.073 0.832 -48.175 0.504 37.569 0.757 -16.844 0.874
Econometric method  -112.199 0.211  -139.459 0.127 -187.082 0.059  -221.632 0.043
F statistic  1.710 0.068  1.260 0.260 2.160 0.016  2.440 0.009
(degrees of freedom)   (19, 48)    (15, 52) (19, 48)   (15, 52)
R
2   0.483   0.452 0.676   0.646
RMSE  190.640     188.610     153.730    154.250  
a Prob indicates the probability that the estimated coefficient is different from zero, based on robust standard 
errors.  
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Table 5: Meta-Regression Analysis Results, Ordinary Least Squares and Random Effects 
Models (n=1047) 
Model →  OLS Regression  Random Effects 











stat Est.  coef.
Prob> 
stat
Intercept  148.491 0.042  118.937 0.040  148.491 0.042 118.937  0.084
Carbon per ha  -0.163 0.273  – – -0.163 0.659  – –
Carbon per ha sq’d  0.0001 0.139  – – 0.0001 0.671  – –
Marginal cost  130.529 0.075  124.971 0.026  130.529 0.005 124.971  0.003
Date of study  -16.008 0.156  -13.382 0.151  -16.008 0.005  -13.382  0.012
European location  600.459 0.007  585.927 0.005  600.459 0.000 585.927  0.000
Tropics  -58.079 0.058  -31.832 0.024  -58.079 0.295  -31.832  0.521
Boreal ecosystem  -40.759 0.316  -32.859 0.459  -40.759 0.494  -32.859  0.569
Tree planting activity  -106.353 0.155 -113.364 0.137  -106.353 0.033 -113.364  0.021
Forest conservation   -14.357 0.433  -30.069 0.239  -14.357 0.827  -30.069  0.635
Forest management   41.177 0.223  26.853 0.194  41.177 0.399  26.853  0.560
Carbon discount rate  -10.030 0.256  -3.788 0.128  -10.030 0.254  -3.788  0.445
Carbon discount rate 
× carbon per ha  0.005  0.733  – – 0.005  0.918  – –
Discount rate on costs  1.415  0.622  – – 1.415  0.826  – –
Fossil fuel 
substitution -7.445  0.892  16.428 0.672 -7.445  0.923  16.428  0.826
Product carbon sink   42.200 0.074  63.364 0.065  42.200 0.363  63.364  0.143
Opportunity cost of 
land  98.421 0.067  86.432 0.085  98.421 0.053  86.432  0.077
Regional scope  72.059 0.155  48.442 0.177  72.059 0.195  48.442  0.356
Global scope   -97.018 0.052 -113.531 0.066  -97.018 0.305 -113.531  0.223
Econometric method  17.582 0.353  8.759 0.659  17.582 0.805  8.759  0.902
F statistic  7.920 0.000  7.730 0.000   
(degrees of freedom)   (19, 1027)    (15, 1031)  
R
2   0.106   0.104  
RMSE  507.050   506.510  
σu    0.000    0.000 
σe    499.560    498.767 
Rho    0.000    0.000 
R
2:  within     0.0003    0.0002 
       between     0.520    0.512 
       overall     0.1056    0.1041 
Wald χ
2(19)    121.280  0.000  119.740  0.000
Breusch-Pagan LM      
       χ
2(1)             0.800  0.371 1.260  0.261
a Prob indicates the probability that the estimated coefficient is different from zero, based on robust standard 
errors. 
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Table 6: Meta-Regression Analysis Results, Ordinary Least Squares Weighted by Number of 
Observations in each Study (n=63) and Ordinary Least Squares (n=846) 
Model →  Weighted by number of observations 
(n=63) 
 OLS  Regression 
(n=846) 
















Intercept 692.690  0.027  513.465 0.028 203.367 0.063  135.133 0.068
Carbon per ha  -0.088 0.860  – – -0.336 0.045  – –
Carbon per ha sq’d  0.0001 0.387  – – 0.00003 0.508  – –
Marginal cost  91.209 0.116  98.788 0.023 165.674 0.041 132.829 0.011
Date of study  -26.194 0.026 -20.204 0.029 -15.717 0.077 -11.168 0.072
European location  289.261 0.071 346.937 0.034 523.391 0.028 510.765 0.026
Tropics  -335.957 0.043  -180.015 0.040 -79.330 0.080 -19.026 0.259
Boreal ecosystem  176.111 0.144 126.171 0.210 135.639 0.262 123.526 0.276
Tree planting activity  -449.525 0.028  -405.156 0.034 -124.951 0.140  -137.921 0.125
Forest conservation   146.837 0.036  99.223 0.109 -20.601 0.473 -52.931 0.248
Forest management   -149.908 0.055  -182.049 0.047 -25.063 0.370 -48.955 0.260
Carbon discount rate  -25.406 0.122 -16.707 0.097 -24.227 0.123 -16.835 0.151
Carbon discount rate 
× carbon per ha  -0.055  0.409  – – 0.051 0.161  – –
Discount rate on costs  -2.582  0.817  – – -6.722 0.242  – –
Fossil fuel 
substitution -135.767  0.286  -99.029 0.365 59.499 0.251  62.411 0.222
Product carbon sink   185.892 0.043 228.694 0.025 58.205 0.131 101.270 0.091
Opportunity cost of 
land 200.445  0.102  198.414 0.095 217.881 0.108  198.957 0.121
Regional scope  64.104 0.322  52.484 0.318 56.050 0.048  14.864 0.305
Global scope   62.087 0.630 -37.841 0.721 -169.672 0.135  -196.522 0.137
Econometric method  -197.389 0.090  -243.139 0.051 -46.627 0.428 -60.914 0.360
F statistic  1.360 0.197  1.020 0.456 3.570 0.000  3.460 0.000
(degrees of freedom)   (19, 43)    (15, 47) (19, 826)   (15, 830)
R
2   0.692   0.653 0.107   0.102
RMSE  162.070     164.680     557.420    557.650  
a Prob indicates the probability that the estimated coefficient is different from zero, based on robust standard 
errors. 
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Table 7: Marginal Costs of Creating Carbon Offset Credits through Forestry ($/tCO2) 







Global  $28.85 $25.10 $28.96  $24.04
Planting   $0.26 -$4.93 -$22.52  -$27.03
Planting & opportunity cost of land   $29.80 $21.91 $32.15  $32.39
Planting, opportunity cost of land & fuel 
substitution 
-$40.14 $19.88 -$4.88  $48.62
Forest management  $88.47 $35.31 $59.20  $0.22
Forest management & opportunity cost of 
land 
$118.01 $62.15 $113.87  $59.64
Forest management, opportunity cost of land 
& fuel substitution 
$48.07 $60.12 $76.84  $75.86
Forest conservation  $158.28 $20.16 $140.13  $1.43
Forest conservation & opportunity cost of 
land 
$187.82 $47.00 $194.80  $60.85
Europe  $173.26 $183.64 $140.48  $162.81
Planting & opportunity cost of land   $185.44 $180.14 $158.29  $170.61
Planting, opportunity cost of land & fuel 
substitution 
$115.50 $178.11 $121.26  $186.84
Forest management & opportunity cost of 
land 
$273.65 $220.38 $240.01  $197.86
Forest management, opportunity cost of land 
& fuel substitution 
$203.71 $218.35 $202.98  $214.08
Tropics (CDM Projects)  -$26.20 $4.04 -$30.04  -$1.56
Planting & opportunity cost of land  -$25.26 $0.85 -$26.84  $6.79
Planting, opportunity cost of land & fuel 
substitution 
-$95.20 -$1.18 -$63.87  $23.02
Forest management & opportunity cost of 
land 
$62.95 $41.09 $54.87  $34.04
Forest management, opportunity cost of land 
& fuel substitution 
-$6.99 $39.06 $17.84  $50.26
Conservation $103.22 -$0.90 $81.13  -$24.17
Conservation & opportunity cost of land  $132.76 $25.94 $135.80  $35.25
Boreal Region  $58.01 $8.77 $109.62  $57.06
Planting & opportunity cost of land  $70.19 $5.26 $127.43  $64.86
Planting, opportunity cost of land & fuel 
substitution 
$0.25 $3.23 $90.40  $81.09
Forest management & opportunity cost of 
land 
$158.40 $45.50 $209.15  $92.11
Forest management, opportunity cost of land 
& fuel substitution 
$88.46 $43.47   $172.12  $108.33
a 2005 US dollars. Multiplying by 44/12 converts carbon to CO2. The base case for each of the three regions 
below includes discounting of carbon and financial costs (at average values), inclusion of soil carbon, 
regional/national scope, optimization technique, and bottom-up method. 
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